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**URBAN CRISES AND MANAGEMENT:**  
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# Chapter 21

## URBAN PLANNING APPROACHES TO URBAN SAFETY AND SECURITY: A SYNTHESIS OF APPROACHES

by

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### INTRODUCTION

Urban insecurity attributable to crime and violence constitutes a major urbanization challenge to most cities of the world. Although some of the world's largest and fastest urbanizing cities such as Chongking or Tokyo have very low crime rates and could be treated as exceptions, African cities have some of the highest crime rates in the world (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2015). Despite the assertion above, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2015 opine that urban crime, violence and insecurity in large cities tend to be more concentrated, more lethal, more variable than what is obtainable in rural areas. According to Frost and Nowak (2014), it is the complexities within cities that make the issue of violence more complex because of the interplay of socio-economic inequalities, disorder and volatility, all of which complicate the process of monitoring, detecting and evaluating rates and trends of urban violence. It would seem, therefore, that the larger and denser a city, the more vulnerable its population is to violence and crime.

In most cities of the world, heterogeneity in urban violence, is evidenced spatially and temporally. This implies that urban crime and violence is not evenly distributed geographically, socio-economically and demographically, thus giving rise to disparities in the indicators that qualify for very safe and very unsafe areas. Also, urban crime and attendant heightened levels of insecurity undergo dynamic transformation processes over time and space as is evidenced in the changing methods, objectives, and perpetrators of violence. These, in turn, make the task of designing targeted, yet flexible programmes to tackle armed violence and its impact extremely difficult (Frost and Nowak (2014).

### URBANIZATION AND URBAN CRIME: THE NEXUS

In trying to examine the various factors that fuel crime, urban violence and insecurity, there are agreements in the literature that large-scale, rapid and unregulated urbanization is one major factor. Muggah and Alvazzi del Frate (n.d.); Shopeju (2007) have surmised that there are two composite predisposing factors contributing to the escalation of urban crime and violence in highly urbanized areas. These are the structural and proximate factors. Structural factors include such issues as limited education, under- and unemployment, income inequality and uncontrolled

urban planning. Proximate factors on the other hand include segregation, urban density, limited faith in public security, informal social organizations such as gangs and militia, and arms availability.

Between 60% and 70% of urban residents in most African countries live in slums. Residents of sprawling slums and shantytowns are therefore exposed to risk of criminal violence, which is a significant determinant of urban safety levels. Besides, such environments act as 'breeding grounds' for armed criminal gangs and vigilantism, thereby creating an unvirtuous cycle of human insecurity (Small Arms Survey, 2007). Because these slums are often located outside the reach of formal policing institutions, impoverished slum dwellers are less able to enforce the regulation on the use of weapons, including firearms. The inability of government institutions to keep pace with demographic growth also undermines public safety perception, which in turn complicates the public provision of security and justice to citizens.

In terms of impact on the liveability of cities, the issue of urban insecurity has a negative impact on various aspects of development. With regards to development costs, it erodes human and physical capital, entrenches inequalities and reduces productivity and investments. Thus, the urban environment, while offering attractive socio-economic opportunities, also provide a context in which violence can grow. Urbanization brings its own development challenges, because some countries, such as Nigeria, are unable to respond to the demands of rapid urban growth occasioned by intra city population growth and migration from the rural areas. The resultant effect is an overstretched infrastructure, poor social services delivery, and inadequate security services provision within such urban areas.

In the Nigerian context, crime and violence constitute a huge threat to public safety. They cause great personal suffering, material damage and place enormous burden on the urban social network (Agbola, 1997). In both scholarly and public opinion, crime and violence are associated with harm, destruction of properties and denial of respect to people and institutions, whether in rural or urban setting. The impacts of crime and violence, especially in cities, have been recognized as a growing and serious challenge in all parts of the world affecting citizens' safety and security. It is against this backdrop that Bate (2009) notes that the most prosperous nations in the world are not necessarily those with a high GDP, but those with happy, healthy, safe and free citizens. Paulsen (2013) also notes that issues of crime and violence should not simply be footnotes in sustainability discourse, but necessary components in designing truly sustainable cities. At micro levels, Metzger (2000) is of the opinion that there is a near universal agreement that crime and the fear of crime are not only major causes of neighbourhood decline, but also key indicators of neighbourhoods in need of renewal.

Furthermore, the effects of crime and violence induce a level of deterioration of the social fabric and the loss of investments related to crime and violence tends to generate a vicious cycle of degradation. These have serious implications for democracy, economic development, social life and social capital of nations. Further implication of unsafe communities is that it gives rise to insecure communities and a culture of fear which heightens the negative effects of social exclusion and contribute to poor quality of life. Thus, urban violence and crime as well as its far reaching consequences have emerged as one of the major preoccupations of policy-makers,

planners and development practitioners in cities and municipalities of the world, resulting in widespread research discourse and policy directions.

### **DISTRIBUTION OF CRIME AND PATTERN OF VICTIMIZATION IN NIGERIA**

The Nigerian urban crime menu, as gleaned from the literature include: militancy, kidnapping, bombings, dare-devil armed robbery, vandalization of government properties and wanton destruction of lives and properties. These insecurity challenges have assumed a spatial spread and observable patterns can easily be mapped out on a regional basis. For example, ethnic militancy are prevalent in the Niger Delta, militia groups' insurgency and terrorism in the north, kidnapers in the eastern and southern part of the country, ritual killings in the west, political and non-politically motivated assassinations across the nation. The regionalized structure of insecurity has also given rise to regionally unlegislated security formations in the country in a bid to curtail the alarming rate of insecurity. The activities of these various groups result in low income for government from oil revenue, moderating the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate, low participation of local and foreign investors in economic development and insecurity of lives and properties of the citizens (FinIntell, 2014).

In a bid to lend credence to this assertion that Nigeria is in a 'war situation' in terms of urban insecurity, the Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN) foundation (2014), found, in a nationwide victimization survey, that a quarter of respondents, that is 25% of Nigerians, affirmed that they had been victims of crime and violence in the previous year prior to the survey. The survey also indicated that the number of victims of crime was highest in Enugu State with 70%, followed by Ekiti and Ebonyi States (both 65%) compared against the national average of 25%. Lagos State recorded 18%. Katsina State had 9%, while Ogun State had the lowest score of 5%. In terms of analysis of experience of crime by regions in Nigeria, the South East recorded highest with 44% while the North West recorded lowest score of 18%. Further disaggregation by gender indicates that men (77%) had more actual experience of crime than women (23%). Similarly, survey on fear of becoming a victim of crime also showed significant variation. The findings of the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) carried out by the CLEEN Foundation (2015) indicate that more than 7 out of 10 Nigerians (72%) were fearful of becoming victims of crime. Across States, Ogun and Ondo State recorded the highest with 94%, while Benue and Taraba States recorded the lowest with 38%. Analyzing by gender, 73% of females feared becoming victims of crime compared to 27% of males (CLEEN Foundation, 2015).

As a result of the rising spate of insecurity and attendant challenges, larger sums of money have been allocated by the Nigerian government to stem this unwarranted trend. As reported by Vanguard (2018), the percentage of annual budgetary allocation to security agencies has been comparatively high for seven consecutive years thereby impinging on the percentage allocated to capital projects and infrastructure as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: National Budget and budgetary Allocation to Security in Nigeria (2012-2018)

S/N	Year	Budget (N'trn)	Allocation to Security (N'bn)	% of budget
1	2012	4.877	921.91	18.90
2	2013	4.987	1.055	21.16
3	2014	4.962	968.127	19.51
4	2015	5.068	388.459	7.67
5	2016	6.061	429.128	7.08
6	2017	7.444	465.87	6.26
7	2018	9.120	580.145	6.36

Source: Vanguard, 2018

## **EVOLVING CONCEPTS AND THEORIES IN URBAN SAFETY AND SECURITY DISCOURSES**

As crime and fear of crime become increasingly endemic, scholars in the field of urban and regional planning continue to explore more relevant views at greater understanding of security issues. Similarly, economic and social realities in world development have continued to provoke a reactionary approach to the development of concepts to capture such realities. Such concepts as 'sustainable development' 'inclusive cities', 'smart cities', etc, have made concerted efforts to include safety issues in the overall development needs of cities. It is interesting to note that whatever word, acronym or parameters of development may be coined, it has become very clear and visible that such development objectives will not be successful without a safe and secure environment. Armitage (2007); Glasson and Cozens (2011) all observe that there is a growing body of research that links urban sustainability with crime. It is increasingly recognized that a sustainable community is one that is both safe and perceived by its residents to be safe from crime. Similarly, Prasad (2015) observes that various kinds of security threats which smart cities are prone to, particularly cyber-attacks, can bring the entire city structure to a standstill. In Prasad's opinion, one of the biggest concerns about smart cities is that the sensors in the equipment can be hacked and fed fake data, which could be used for all manner of mischief, like causing signal failures that can shut down subways or allow contaminants into the public water supply, etc. In such scenario where urban terrorism seems to be the new modus operandi, there is, therefore, a need to look into urban security and particularly security of smart cities from a completely new perspective.

Thus, as a means of ensuring that cities are liveable, sustainable and smart, the concept of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) was evolved by Jeffrey (1971) and has been increasingly adopted as strategies, guidance and policies throughout countries in the developed world and in many developing countries (Schneider and Kitchen, 2007; Cozens, 2008). However, as noted by Cozens (2011), although this development is positive, it has nonetheless been argued that planners need a broader understanding of environmental criminology which explains patterns and trends in crime as they relate to the built environment. Indeed, Brantingham and Brantingham (1998) cited in Cozens (2011), have asserted that 'most planning proceeds with little knowledge of crime patterns, crime attractors, crime generators, the importance of edges, paths and nodes or the site specific solutions that facilitate or even encourage crime'.

Dempsey (2008) lists a range of features that have long been promoted in urban planning and design as socially beneficial, including high residential densities, mixed land uses, accessibility, connectedness and permeability, legibility, attractiveness, inclusiveness, maintenance, safety and character which are the elements of new urbanism in some developed countries and increasingly adopted in the developing countries. While these might not have been empirically proven, other authors have sought to provide theoretical evidence which would help our understanding of crime issues within the urban planning discourses. For instance, Schneider and Kitchen (2007) argue that 'if planning is about making places better for people, then it has to address those elements that make places 'problematic for people, and crime and the fear of crime are high up this list'. Since the planning profession does not traditionally study the temporal and spatial location of crime (or the fear of crime), planners therefore have to forage across academic disciplines and adopt concepts, theories and evidence from the field of criminology into planning discourses (Cozens, 2011). The section that follows presents an array of concepts and theories which have informed and influenced the thinking and practice in urban safety and security.

### **CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN (CPTED)**

The Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) pioneered by C.R Jeffrey (1971) espouses the situational crime prevention approach and broader urban planning initiatives by modifying the physical environment to reduce opportunities for crime to occur (Crawford, 1998, Cherney and White, 2008). Like the SCP, CPTED works on the premise that most crime events are associated with opportunities created by environmental design and that manipulating those opportunities can deter crime. Agbola (1997) however, opines that CPTED procedures are not to create impregnable fortresses but merely to make penetration more difficult and more time consuming.

The various elements of CPTED are applicable in specific situations. Practically, for CPTED strategy to work, residents must exhibit a sense of territoriality and seek to defend their environment with a sense of pride and ownership. This is captured in the activities of neighbourhood residents who form watch groups to defend their territory. The twin elements of territoriality and surveillance strategy empower legal occupants of a neighbourhood to exercise a high degree of visual control over the entire area.

CPTED also advocates sufficient lighting, security barriers and landscaping of territorial spaces to combat crimes. Sufficient lighting eliminates fear of crime from residents. Lighting should be used in such a way that it lights up the criminal without spotlighting the users. Security barriers reduce crime by restricting access to the target area. Agbola (1997) puts forth a range of physical barriers which should prevent movements to include: fencing, burglar proofing, heavy metal doors, locked doors/gates, small windows, unbreakable glazed but expansive windows to allow see through and some form of landscaping as well as symbolic barriers.

CPTED is traditionally based upon the concept of defensible space: 'a range of mechanisms; real and symbolic barriers, strongly-defined areas of influence, and improved opportunities for surveillance that combine to bring an environment under the control of its residents'' (Newman, 1973). The routine maintenance of the built environment is also important and can foster a sense of territoriality, ownership and

pride within the community enhancing safety. Following criticisms in the 1970s and 1980s, defensible space ideas have been developed and refined and are now expanded to include the dimension of 'activity support'. This refers to the use of urban design and signage to encourage intended patterns of usage of urban space as 'the proper design and effective use of the built environment can lead to a reduction in the fear of crime and the incidence of crime, and to an improvement in the quality of life' (Crowe, 2000). From the foregoing, it can be upheld that designing an environment that is capable of defending itself through CPTED strategies heightens the safety and security level of neighbourhoods better than those neighbourhoods that have been left to chance. The refinement of CPTED became necessary because of the observed limitations of the concept over time. For example, research has demonstrated how the social dynamics of an area, and particularly fear of crime, can affect the effectiveness of Newman's ideas and CPTED.

### **DEFENSIBLE SPACE**

Oscar Newman's defensible space theory (1973) is similar to CPTED principles in many ways. Both advocate that a carefully planned environment is capable of defending itself. However, defensible space is hinged on three main components: target-hardening, controlling access and increasing opportunities for surveillance. According to Agbola (1997), natural surveillance should avoid the following: features of landscapes like trees, shrubs, flower beds do not block the vision of occupants of the building; landscape materials should not create areas of concealment where intruders could hide to perform nefarious acts; trees, telephone and electric poles should not provide climbing paths for criminals. Also, provision for glazed and expansive windows should allow a see through wherever the occupants of a building may be while fencing materials should eliminate blind spots or places of concealment. Defensible space theory also advocates for artificial surveillance which should include, but not be limited to, the use of fixed guards or human guard posts, organized security patrols such as vigilantes, use of trained animals such as guard/security dogs, as well as the use of electronic monitoring devices such as CCTV.

Generally, 'Defensible space' is urban space that is 'capable of being defended' by residents, but can become 'undefended' as a consequence of fear of crime. Furthermore, the same space can become defended and exploited by those who would seek to use it for their own illegal purposes ( e.g. gangs and drug dealers). This is referred to as 'offensible space' (Atlas, 1991). Finally, urban space can become 'indefensible' (Cozens, 2002), whereby it is 'incapable of being defended' by residents (e.g. urban riot and mob action) (see Fig 1). As the social dynamics of a space changes, the effectiveness of 'defensible space' both in theory and application also changes. This social dimension has also been reflected in the development of second-generation CPTED which considers the social, political and economic complexities of crime and violence at different scales (e.g. individual, family, community, society) and is adopted by different kinds of programmes (e.g. situational crime prevention, social development programmes and community crime prevention programmes). This trend is also reflected in the UN-Habitat Safer Cities Programme (2006), launched in 1996, at the request of particularly, African mayors who were seeking to address urban violence by developing prevention strategies at city level.

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<p><b>'Defensible Space'</b> (Newman, 1973) <i>Capable of being defended</i></p>	↑	<p><b>Low Levels</b></p>
<p><b>'Un defended Space'</b> (Merry, 1981) <i>Not actively defended</i></p>	↓	<p><b>Fear of Crime</b></p>
<p><b>'Offensible Space'</b> (Atlas, 1991) <i>Defended by 'others'</i></p>	↑	
<p><b>'Indefensible Space'</b> (Cozens, 2002) <i>Incapable of being defended</i></p>	↓	
<p><b>'Indefensible Space'</b> (Cozens, 2002) <i>Incapable of being defended</i></p>	↑	

Fig 1: A taxonomy of defensible space and fear of crime.

Source: Cozens, (2002).

**ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY**

Research consistently reveals that crime is not randomly distributed across urban space, but rather different types of crime cluster at certain locations and at certain times. Environmental criminology, therefore, concentrates on the spatial location of crime and the fear of crime and how individuals' behaviour is influenced by place-based factors. It is defined as 'the study of crime, criminality, and victimisation as they relate, first, to particular places, and, secondly, to the way that individuals and organisations shape their activities by place-based or spatial factors' (Bottoms and Wiles, 1997). Environmental criminology theory is underpinned by three related crime opportunity theories that provide an alternative perspective from which to consider the issues of permeable urban configurations, mixed-use developments and higher densities and to promote cross-disciplinary dialogue and more informed and consequently, potentially more effective, decision-making. Cornish and Clarke's (1986) 'rational choice theory' argues that most opportunistic criminals are rational in their decision-making and recognize, evaluate and respond to a variety of environmental cues. These are environmental factors and signals within the built environment, which relate to the perceived risk, rewards and effort associated with an offence and are central to the offender's decision-making process.

Cohen and Felson's (1979) 'routine activities theory' otherwise referred to as opportunity theory argues that for a crime to take place, there must be a motivated offender, a suitable target and the absence of capable guardians. The theory put forward the "crime triangle" and identifies the trio of offender, victim/target and situation as basic elements that must occur in time and space before a crime can occur. Crime is, therefore, more likely at this conjunction of criminal opportunity (Ekblom, 2008). Offenders, like most citizens, have routine daily activities (work/school, visiting friends, shopping and entertainment) during which criminals might discover or search for potential targets. These routine activities and travel routes form the 'awareness space' (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984) of the offender (see figure 2). Indeed, Brantingham and Brantingham (1993) argue that 'all people, including those who commit crime, develop an awareness space from which crime targets are usually picked'.




Brantingham and Brantingham's (1984) 'crime pattern theory' seeks to understand the search and selection processes that criminals use and analyses how people and objects associated with crime move about in space and time. Crimes against the person predominantly take place at home or in and around drinking establishments (Fattah, 1991) while property crimes are concentrated at or near activity nodes and attractors, where people congregate (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993, 1998, 2008; Kinney et al., 2008). These locations include the home, shopping centres, work/school, sports areas, parks and recreation centres and along the routes that connect these nodes. Indeed, in *Crime and Everyday Life*, Felson and Boba (2010) observe how daily life is divided into different types of settings, which can generate significant amounts of crime. The riskiest settings are places and situations and these include: public routes (especially footpaths, parking facilities and unsupervised transit areas); recreational settings (especially bars and some parks); public transport (especially stations and their vicinities); retail stores (especially for shoplifting); educational settings (especially at their edges); offices (especially when entered for theft); human support services (especially hospitals with 24-hour activities) and; industrial locations (especially warehouses with 'attractive' goods). It is these considerations that give rise to the Situational Crime Prevention (SCP).

### SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION (SCP)

Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) as a concept utilizes the physical dimensions of CPTED, but focuses on existing, specific crime problems, rather than on anticipating crime problems for new developments on the basis of past experiences with similar designs. SCP is also closely aligned with environmental criminology and adopts the problem-solving methodology of problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1990).

Figure 2: Awareness spaces – routine activities theory.



Source: Cozens (2011).

The concept of SCP derives from the British Home Office's crime prevention strategy in the 1960s and 1970s. It operates predominantly at the micro-scale. It is crime specific, can be multi-tactical, and is heavily influenced by opportunity theories, which underpin environmental criminology. Clarke (1997) extended early SCP ideas

and developed 16 elements to SCP. These were recently expanded to 25 (Cornish and Clarke, 2003), and clearly extend beyond traditional physical intervention strategies such as CPTED.

The situational crime prevention approach is based on the opportunity theory of crime prevention and was put forward by Mayhew, Clarke, Sturman and Hough (1976). It simply advocates the reduction of opportunities for any kind of crime which may occur in any kind of setting. Cornish and Clarke, (2003) later advanced that the SCP involves identifying, manipulating and controlling the situational and environmental factors associated with certain types of crimes. Manipulation of immediate environment entails blocking opportunities structures of a specific crime. For instance, under SCP, lighting an area may deter likely offenders since it increases risks of detection. Cornish and Clarke, (2003) further classified SCP techniques into five broad categories. These include: increasing the effort involved in offending, increasing the risk associated with offending, reducing the rewards that come from committing a crime, reducing the situational factors that influence the propensity of an individual to offend, as well as removing excuses for offending behaviours.

SCP as a strategy for improving safety and security of urban neighbourhoods suggests that understanding the aetiology of specific types of crime helps planners to develop specific measures for crime control, which in turn increases the success of an intervention.


SCP now extends beyond opportunity to include temptations, inducements and provocations. Recently, Wortley (2008) developed the SCP categories of reducing provocations and removing excuses into a framework of 16 situational precipitators. There are four ways that the immediate environment might potentially precipitate criminal behaviour. Environmental cues can prompt criminal behaviour, while social forces can exert pressure on individuals and encourage offending. Situational factors can weaken moral prohibitions and permit criminal behaviour, and the immediate environment can also provoke criminal behaviour. A study by Cozens and Greive (2009) discusses some of these crime precipitators as they relate to urban governance issues and a lack of integrated planning in an entertainment district within the night-time economy. These include, for example, poor public transport facilities and taxi ranks, a concentration of large venues and a lack of toilet facilities. Clearly, different land uses (and the urban governance that regulates them) are associated with both different types and different levels of crime in diverse and dynamic ways—and at different times of the day, week, season or year.

Furthermore, crime has been suggested as representing an 'externality' of development and a form of pollution. Indeed, in relation to crime and specific types of land-use, Farrell and Roman (2006) argue that alcohol manufacturers and licensees make extensive profits, but do not bear any of the social costs of this crime pollution – or this 'externality' of this type of land-use development. Clearly, there are crime risks to new urban developments (provided by the local environmental backcloth) and crime impacts of such developments. The risks and impacts must be clearly defined and mapped for any meaningful and robust safety study to be achieved. The procedure and principles involved form the crux and focus of the next section.

## **CRIME RISK ASSESSMENT VERSUS CRIME IMPACT ASSESSMENT**

The issue pivotal to the application of Urban planning to safety is hinged on how physical planning theories drive real time practice. In recent times, an understanding of how crime and violence can be mapped spatially and temporally have been thoroughly delved into. Ekblom (2008) notes that there exists a basic difference between how crime risks assessment and crime impacts assessment can best be situated in urban studies. In his analysis, a crime risk assessment relates to incoming threats from elsewhere, whilst a crime impact assessment refers to exported threats from one's own activity. Ekblom defines crime risk assessment as an endeavour to systematically and rigorously identify the crime risks 'out there' which may face some proposed new entity for which we are responsible. This entity may be a place (such as a new building), product (e.g. a new model of car), service (e.g. a new kind of internet delivery service), business model (e.g. a new kind of banking) or anything else which could become embroiled in crime in some way (Ekblom, 2008).

A crime impact assessment on the other hand 'is the counterpart where the focus shifts to considering the criminogenic or criminally harmful consequences of one's own proposals' (Ekblom, 2008). Conducting a crime impact assessment, therefore, involves 'scrutinising any proposal for action (such as a new product, place, service or even a business model) in terms of its likely effect in the wider world 'out there', on the range of known causes and risk factors of crime' (Ekblom, 2008). It is argued that a deeper understanding of the theories and evidence from environmental criminology can enhance planners' appreciation of both crime risks to new developments and the crime impacts of such developments (see figure 3). This understanding of crime risks and crime impacts arguably contribute towards a more holistically constructed consideration of crime—and encourage planners to think beyond a simplistic, formulaic approach to CPTED.



**Fig.3:** Crime Risks *to* and Crime Impacts *of* Different Urban Land Uses.

*Source:* Cozens, 2011

## **FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: PHYSICAL PLANNING APPROACHES TO URBAN SAFETY AND SECURITY**

It is apparent that there have been great improvements in the planners' thoughts and actions with regards to concepts development and theorization, from the most elementary and traditional to the more sophisticated and 'smart' approaches. There has also been several reconfigurations of CPTED strategies to address some

spatial contexts of crime. The result is a mix menu of different approaches of CPTED geared to addressing urban crime. In practice, these theories do not operate in watertight compartments but allow for considerable overlap.

Several neighbourhood designs like 'Designing Out Crime (DOC)' and 'Designing Against Crime (DAC)' have lent themselves to the principles espoused by key concepts such as the CPTED and defensible space. 'Designing Out Crime' is informed by the fact that risk of crime can be reduced through careful design, ensuring that homes and public spaces are visible, making it harder for people to commit crime without being seen. Designing out crime put forward by Clarke and Mayhew in 1980 has been popular throughout the 1990s. The approach stipulates that design practitioners consciously develop guidelines to help reduce the risk of crime in neighbourhoods. This, like the CPTED principle, is to create an environment where informal but effective community surveillance takes place naturally through the use of natural surveillance, defensible space and community interaction. Design Against Crime (DAC), on the other hand, is a socially responsive, practice-based research initiative, which uses the processes and products of design to reduce crime and promote community safety whilst improving quality-of-life. DAC is a relatively new, interdisciplinary area of enquiry developed through innovative national and international research collaborations.

DAC coalesces the conceptual frameworks, methodologies and practices of situational crime prevention, social anthropology, cognitive psychology and user-centred design. It develops hybrid approaches to the quantitative and qualitative specification and evaluation of products, services and environments which inherently reduce the incidence, impact and fear of crime. Designing Against Crime focuses on product, for instance, doors, windows, burglar-proofing materials to keep out crime from occurring.

Another application of defensible space principles is the creation of 'gated neighbourhoods'. 'Gated neighbourhoods' have been used to mean a socially secluded part of the urban area enjoying specific advantages over the other areas within the same urban fabric (Fabiyyi, 2004). Within such enclaves, security is achieved through a multiplicity of ways and strategies. These include the development of gated/guarded enclaves, target-hardening, access control into/out of neighbourhoods, and increased surveillance through closed circuit television. The main aim is to create spatial entities that can be controlled and where the principles of CPTED, defensible space and Situational Crime prevention can better be applied for better results.

Crime Prevention through Urban Design and Planning (CP-UDP) is another strategy that applies the principles of defensible space to real life situation. It highlights three basic principles that could ensure safety of urban areas in more practical ways. The principles are categorized under urban planning strategies, urban design strategies and urban management strategies as shown in Table 2.

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**Table 2: Crime Prevention through Urban Design and Planning (CP-UDP)**

Urban Planning Strategies (Macro/City Level)	Urban Design Strategies (Meso/Neighbourhood Level)	Management Strategies (Micro/Street/Dwelling Level)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social/Physical structures</li> <li>• Guaranteed accessibility</li> <li>• Avoiding enclaves</li> <li>• Creating vitality in designs</li> <li>• Mixed status</li> <li>• Adequate urban density</li> <li>• Avoiding physical barriers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Layout</li> <li>• Specific location of activities</li> <li>• Natural surveillance</li> <li>• Visibility</li> <li>• Accessibility</li> <li>• Territoriality</li> <li>• Attractiveness</li> <li>• Robustness</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Target hardening</li> <li>• Access control within blocks/neighbourhoods</li> <li>• Surveillance (Patrolling, camera, monitoring)</li> <li>• Provision of street infrastructures</li> <li>• Street lighting</li> <li>• Communication</li> </ul>

*Source:* Adapted after Someren, 2013.

Furthermore, crime prevention through urban planning considers the following safety issues. These are:

**i. Where do crimes occur mostly?**

- Assessment of spatial distribution of "safer places" and "crime hotspots" within the urban setting
- Spatial mapping of spread and distribution of crime incidents in the area under focus.
- Definition of area/spatial extents of secure/insecure neighbourhoods

**ii. What are the cardinal issues to be addressed?**

- What is the crime problem?- types, nature, prevalence, etc.
- What are the modalities for crime auditing and framework for crime budgeting?
- How are crime review and assessment carried out?
- What are the plans, scenarios, strategies, costs, anticipated effects of social exclusions?

**iii. Who is involved in urban crime management?**

- What methods are adopted for the identification of stakeholders?.
- How many partners are involved?
- Which is the decision making body?
- What level of collaboration is expected from various stakeholders?
- Is it multi-sectoral/inter-agencies/intra-agencies partnership?

Planners therefore need a careful analysis of the impacts of their designs and developments so as not to design-in criminal opportunities by what they do in their various typologies of land use plans.

As espoused in this paper, all CPTED and defensible space strategies are secured by design and all opportunistic and environmental approaches aimed at achieving improved safety in neighbourhoods require surveillance strategy to work better.

## CONCLUSION

The various arguments above have x-rayed the various methods of mitigating crime and insecurity in urban areas. Accordingly, the Town Planning profession will require a re-ordering of priorities and objectives to be able to encapsulate the changing nature of problems facing the Nigerian state. To create a functional, safe and workable urban environment capable of preserving lives and properties, urban planners will need to isolate the various pressing urban problems such as insecure neighbourhoods and address their problems through planning and designs capable of handling safety issues.

Unfortunately, however, as Demsey (2008) observes, there is no consensus on how a safe built environment should be or can be designed. This is because even if all planning design principles to aid urban security are considered, there would still be lapses. For example, for the often popularized 'eyes on the street' for enhanced surveillance, Sorensen (2003) observes that 'pedestrian traffic tends to increase risk (from the standpoint of target selection) and decrease risk (from the standpoint of natural surveillance) depending on whether that traffic is through traffic or local traffic'. Furthermore, as Newman (2003) and others have observed, the presence of 'eyes on the street' does not guarantee intervention. Indeed, studies, which have investigated bystander apathy, have found that as the number of bystanders increases, the likelihood for intervention decreases. Cozen (2011) also observes that the study of bystander behaviour is important to understanding crime and has recently been applied to the field of interpersonal violence. Similarly, it is assumed that permeability, high densities and mixed-use developments would reduce urban insecurity but these have also been proved to have lapses.

However, what cannot be ignored is the fact that there is widespread agreement that safety is an essential feature of high quality built environments. From this perspective, Cozen (2011) argues that built-environment professionals (architects and especially planners and urban designers) should arguably possess a more critical and detailed knowledge of how crime and the fear of crime are intricately interwoven within the mosaic of the city. That is, if safety from crime is such a fundamental dimension to a healthy city, one might question why such a dearth of knowledge exists within planning, on the patterns of crime, which are an integral part of the mosaic of our cities. Indeed, Felson (2006) suggests that within the ecosystem that is the city, different crimes have discrete settings, niches and habitats and that the web of crime is a complex living system that links legal and illegal activities within the larger ecosystem.

It is therefore suggested that understanding crime patterns and the ecology of crime is more meaningful when opportunity theories and evidence from environmental criminology are considered. Such an understanding for and of security sector reform will entail a mix of options, with enabling laws for each of the options and an umbrella law to co-ordinate the activities of all the actors in a synergistically sustainable manner. Such laws should view all actors as partners who do not erode the

monopolistic stance of the state actors but delegated partners whose duties sum up to the composite whole.

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